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We develop a model of a representative professional sports club operating in a league that 
has the option of adopting one of two different forms of revenue sharing: traditional revenue 
sharing and central-pool type revenue sharing. To adopt either form of revenue sharing, the league 
requires that a majority of clubs increase profit with adoption of the plan. We derive necessary 
conditions for either plan to garner enough support for a majority vote. The likelihood of forming 
a majority also depends on the conjectures on acquiring talent that clubs possess. Competitive 
conjectures make revenue sharing more likely, while cartel conjectures make revenue sharing less 
likely. Empirical results provide evidence in favor of the model for four North American 
professional sports leagues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The expansion of professional sport has been a hallmark of the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Professional leagues of baseball, football, basketball, and hockey bear scant resemblance 
to those same leagues prior to World War II.  In North America the sheer scale and daily media 
coverage of Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), or the National Hockey League (NHL) today is a testimony to the 
success of the business. 
And successful they have been. For those clubs that have survived, franchise values have 
increased dramatically.  Among major North American sports, in the last decade of the century 
the value of franchises increased by an average annual rate of 10.7 percent in the NHL to 17.7 
percent in the NBA (Quirk and Fort, 1999.)  Entry into these leagues has also become expensive.  
During the ‘nineties, the cheapest expansion into the NHL cost $35.5 million while a new team in 
the NBA reached a high of nearly $200 million.  In the same period the franchise fees grew at an 
average annual rate of 18.3 percent for the NHL and an impressive 70.2 percent for the NBA 
(Quirk and Fort, 1999.) Around the world, football (soccer) has shared in the explosion of 
interest.  One club alone, Manchester United, turned down a $1 billion purchase offer.  The 1998 
World Cup reached 33.4 billion viewers:  five times the world’s population.  Television rights for 
the 2006 World Cup matches in Germanys sold for 1.5 billion Swiss Francs ($1 billion US). 
Part of the price of rapid growth is increased scrutiny.  In North America professional 
sports leagues share a number of characteristics that distinguish their structure, conduct and 
performance from any other industry.
1 We take a league as composed of individual firms that 
maximize their own profits. Each firm does so through local ticket pricing and by selling local 
broadcasting rights. These firms are members of the league cartel, so they also undertake actions 
to maximize league profits without jeopardizing their own local profits
2. The cartel is allowed to 
sell national broadcasting and merchandising rights with the proceeds divided evenly among the 
cartel members. The cartel typically enforces a player draft system, revenue sharing and other 
activities in which all clubs participate. Finally, firms within the cartel cannot be sold or relocated 
without permission of a majority of the cartel members, nor can new firms join the cartel without 
                                                 
1 Although many of these characteristics are also shared by non North American leagues, this paper focuses 
explicitly on North American leagues for which data although sparse are more readily available than for the 
others. 
2 Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988) suggest that team owners maximize utility since they may prefer 
winning to higher profits if given a tradeoff. This may be true, but we have chosen to exploit the more 
simple profit maximization approach, particularly since there may be no tradeoff between winning and 
profits.   3
a majority vote. These cartel policies clearly are designed to restrict entry of new firms and 
maintain the profits of the existing firms and the league, but are protected from antitrust 
legislation by the decision in Federal League vs. Baseball (1922).  
One particular phenomenon that has arisen in the context of leagues is that of revenue 
sharing.  It is a controversial financial tool that is currently used in MLB and the NFL. It is 
controversial because owners argue that it increases the economic viability of marginal small 
market clubs that would otherwise fold, and that it also increases parity in play so that large 
revenue clubs cannot persistently dominate small market clubs on the playing field (Levin et al. 
(2000)), while players believe that revenue sharing drives down salaries
3. The latter assertion may 
be of interest to fans and has occasioned much professional discussion (El Hodiri and Quirk 
(1971), Quirk and Fort (1992, 1995), Vrooman (1995), Marburger (1997), Rascher (1997) and 
Késenne (2000) are representative papers), but in our view it has more to do with the fairness of 
play and  skips over the broader issue of addressing disparities in revenue.  A recent panel 
established to study the financial health of MLB concluded that 
 
“Large and growing revenue disparities exist and are causing  problems of chronic 
competitive imbalance.” – Levin et al. (2000), p. 1 
 
“In recent years, there has been a rapidly accelerating disparity in revenues and, 
consequently, payrolls between clubs in high and low-revenue markets. There also has 
been a stronger correlation between club revenues/payrolls and on-field competitiveness 
in the years since the issue of competitive balance was studied by the Joint Economic 
Study Committee which issued its report in 1992. – Ibid., p. 12 
 
The report goes on to discuss means by which revenue sharing and other policies can be 
used to address revenue and payroll disparities, through which disparities in team performance 
can be affected. In our view, if revenue sharing is profit increasing, economic analysis should 
reveal the conditions under which this is likely to be the case, and this is the focus of our paper. 
 
II. REVENUE SHARING 
 
In its most simple form, a revenue sharing system requires that the home club gives the 
visiting club a share of the gate revenue for each game played. We call this “traditional revenue 
sharing”. The share is adjusted periodically with each collective agreement with the players. 
                                                 
3 Major league baseball owners and players agreed on a new collective bargaining agreement just hours 
before a strike deadline of September 1, 2002. The most hotly debated issue was the owner’s insistence to 
increase revenue sharing.   4
MLB adopted a 50-50 split in the 1903 National Agreement that was reduced to 80-20 and 95-5 
for the American and National Leagues respectively by the early 1990s. The NFL used a 66-34 
split in the early nineties that was increased to a 60-40 split by the late nineties. Revenue from 
luxury boxes, concessions and parking are exempt from sharing. Clubs also receive an equal 
share of television, apparel and licensing revenues from league central funds. 
MLB adopted three new forms of revenue sharing in their 1996 collective agreement. We 
call this “central-pool revenue sharing” in its general form. The straight-pool plan requires each 
club to contribute 39% of its net local revenue to a central pool, which is then divided evenly 
among all participating clubs. Net local revenue is a club’s local revenue less its actual stadium 
expenses. The split-pool plan requires each club to contribute 20% of its net local revenue to a 
central pool; 75% of that pool is then divided equally among all participating clubs; the remaining 
25% of the pool is divided only among participating clubs  (side payments)  whose net local 
revenue is below the league average
4. The hybrid plan computes the amount of net revenue each 
club will be rebated under the straight-pool and split-pool plan, and then awards the greater of the 
two. This can result in a shortfall of money in the pool that is made up by luxury taxes and 
monies transferred from the central fund. Estimated net payments from the pool are paid out four 
times a year, starting on May 25, with a final adjustment payment on June 7 of the following 
year. 
MLB implemented its new revenue sharing system in a number of phases. For 1996, the 
hybrid plan was adopted on a 60% basis,  i.e. participating clubs received only 60% of the 
estimated net payment owed from the pool. This remained unchanged until 1998 when the split-
pool plan was implemented on an 80% basis. In 2000, the split-pool plan was operating on a 
100% basis. Currently MLB’s collective agreement with the players has expired, however the 
intent is to continue with the split-pool plan. The NFL will adopt central-pool revenue sharing at 
the start of the 2002 season. 
Table 1 provides a summary of local net revenues and net receipts from the central pool 
for MLB’s 2001 season. Fourteen of the thirty clubs received net payments from the central pool. 
The largest net receiver was the Montreal Expos ($28.5 million) and the largest net payer was the 
New York Yankees ($26.5 million). Quite rightly, owners argue that the system is doing what it 
was designed to do: redistribute revenues from rich to poor clubs in order to maintain parity and a 
financially healthy  league. Yet one must wonder why the New York Yankees would voluntarily 
give away just over 12% of their local operating revenue to help poor clubs? Clubs that earn the 
majority of their revenue from revenue sharing (like the Expos) could be allowed to fail, yielding 
                                                 
4 The exact amount received is increasing in the distance below the league average.   5
greater amounts of revenue from the central fund for all remaining clubs. This is the argument for 
contraction that is currently being debated in the press and in the courts. If central-pool revenue 
sharing is just a zero-sum gain with an equal number of net payers and net receivers, why would a 
majority of clubs support it? 
One possibility is central fund revenues (TV, apparel and licensing rights) are positively 
related to l eague parity and stability. In this case, revenue sharing might be financially beneficial 
even for the Yankees. However, we suggest that there is another motive for revenue sharing: with 
central-pool revenue sharing, profits can increase for all clubs over and above what profit would 
have been without revenue sharing. Hence all clubs will vote to adopt it. With traditional revenue 
sharing, some clubs gain and some lose according to a specific condition derived below. As a 
result, revenue sharing will be adopted if a majority of clubs gain from its use. While revenue 
sharing is a zero-sum gain for the league, the league may benefit from the consequent reductions 
in payroll costs that revenue sharing promotes (Quirk and Fort (1995)). The movement of the 
NFL and MLB from traditional revenue sharing to central-pool revenue sharing may be profit 
maximizing in our framework. 
 
III. A MODEL OF REVENUE SHARING 
 
Fundamental work by Quirk and Fort (1992, 1995) followed by  Vrooman (1995), 
Rascher (1997), and Késenne (2000) shows that, while revenue sharing has no effect on league 
parity, it unambiguously raises profit for every team in the league.  Although these authors arrive 
at this result using different assumptions concerning the supply of talent to the teams, in these 
models, revenue sharing reduces the cost of talent. Winning teams participate in the losing team’s 
losses and consequently reduce the league wide demand for talent. The approach of this paper is 
to build a more general model of a league to investigate revenue sharing. To keep a tight focus, 
we do not explicitly address parity, salary caps, utility of winning, and a host of other important 
issues.  
Conjectures play a key role in determining how team owners perceive the supply curve of 
talent and the subsequent effect of revenue sharing on profit. Quirk and Fort (1995) utilize a 
revenue function that is increasing in the home club’s output (winning percentage). Conjectures 
are necessarily  competitive in the club’s output. However, talent is available in infinite supply at 
constant marginal cost implying that talent conjectures are not competitive. Later in the paper we 
show that profits always increase in the Quirk and Fort framework if talent conjectures are   6
Cournot
5. Vrooman (1995) makes no assumptions concerning conjectures. Rascher (1997) and 
Késenne (1997) assume competitive talent conjectures and find that profit is increasing with 
revenue sharing. Marburger (1997) implicitly assumes Cournot conjectures but utilizes a more 
general revenue function so that revenue sharing has uncertain effects on parity and revenues. 
In this paper we argue that conjectures about talent, the perceived response by team j to a 
change in talent of team i, is central to an understanding of revenue sharing. We investigate the 
supply curve of talent and the talent conjecture of each club in a general way by deriving an 
indirect profit function from profit maximizing behavior. What we show is that revenue sharing 
has very different effects on team and league profit depending both on the nature of the revenue 
sharing formula and the talent conjectures of all clubs. 
 
Traditional revenue sharing 
 
The purpose of this section is to derive necessary conditions for revenue sharing to 
increase team profit using a simple model of a representative team
6. We assume a league with n 
teams using the traditional revenue sharing system  where the profit function,  p1, for team 1 is 
given by 
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where t i is the talent used by team i,  tj is the vector of all other teams talent a is the share of 
revenue retained by the home team, 1, from home park revenues when playing against team every 
other team  j. With traditional revenue sharing, total revenue for team 1 is an a-weighted sum of 
                                                 
5 Although Quirk and Fort (1995) do not explicitly state their assumption of the talent conjecture, implicitly 
they utilize a Cournot conjecture. In their notation, home revenue for team i is an increasing function of the 
“closeness” of the contest when playing team j, given by  ( )
ij ij Z R  and  ( ) ( ) t w t w Z j i
ij - =  where t is a 
vector of league talent and wi is the winning percentage of team i. Maximizing revenue with respect to own 







































































and Quirk and Fort’s equation (3) is obtained. 
6 We assume clubs act so as to maximize their own profit. An alternative setup is for clubs to maximize 
joint profits, such as in Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988). When maximizing national broadcast 
revenues, apparel revenues and other central fund revenues, a cartel model is appropriate. However, to 
maximize cartel profit using only gate revenue, as considered here, would require clubs to have the ability 
to shift attendance demand to the most profitable clubs. It seems unlikely that clubs would have the ability 
to do this, hence we assume clubs maximize their own profit from gate revenue.   7
home revenues that team 1 receives when playing the visiting team j in team 1’s stadium, R1j, and 
the revenues club j receives when team 1 plays in team j’s stadium, Rj1. C(.) is the cost function 
that depends on the level of player talent for each team in the league; in this case, team 1. 
League talent enters a production function that determines game attendance for team 1. 
Per home-game revenue for team 1, R1j, is determined by the product of game attendance A1j and 
average ticket price P 1. Attendance depends on the level of talent of the home team, t1 and the 
visiting team, tj.  
 
) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 j j j j t t P A P R g g + = =               (2a) 
 
The terms g1 and g1j represent the return to attendance from home talent and the talent of team j 
respectively and are assumed to be positive. This approach is similar to Marburger (1997)
7, but 
differs from Pallomino and Rigotti (2000) who also add a specific valuation for “closeness” of 
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In (2), since t 1 is the talent of the home team 1 and tj is the talent of each visiting club, the g’s 
measure a linearized return to talent in the form of attendance and are assumed to be positive.  
The revenue team 1 generates in team j’s stadium when team 1 plays on the road is Rj1. 
Total revenue generated by team 1’s appearances on the road is the sum of each of the other n-1 
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The production functions in (2) and (3) are simplistic in that they assume no cross-
effects, i.e. the marginal product of t1 does not depend on the level of tj and vice-versa. Further, a 
ceiling on talent and a ceiling on attendance are treated as essentially the same thing. For now we 
                                                 
7 Marburger (1997) does not specify an average ticket price in the revenue function. Note that we do not 
write P 1 = P 1(A1j) since more talent increases home attendance at a given average ticket price. Hence an 
increase in talent acts to shift the demand for home attendance to the right.    8
place no ceiling on either although we return to this issue shortly. With a revenue function that is 




1 1 t t C q =                   (4) 
 
Maximizing (1) with respect to t1, subject to (2), (3) and (4) gives the first order condition 
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where  1 t t z j j ¶ ¶ = is the conjecture of team 1 regarding the reactions through talent acquisition 
of each of the other clubs, j, to team 1’s changes in talent. We assume all clubs possess identical 
conjectures
8. The first two large-bracketed terms in (5) give the (conjectured) marginal revenue of 
team 1. That is, an increase in talent for team 1 raises both its attendance at home and the 
attendance of its road games as long as z j is not “too” negative. With revenue sharing, team 1 
shares the revenue from both sources. The final term is the marginal cost of talent.  Solving (5) 
for the optimal talent for team 1, 
*
1 t , gives 
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The solution for t 1 is more easily manipulated if some of its terms are converted to 
averages, represented by a bar over the variable(s), by multiplying and dividing by n-1. After all, 
the owner of team 1 does not really care about the individual game effects on attendance and 
revenue at the end of the season, rather only the average effect per game. Thus 
*
1 t may be 
rewritten as: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
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8 This is overly strong, but is a useful simplification. We will not consider all conjectures but instead treat 
three common specifications: Cournot, competitive and cartel.   9
Maximizing Profits using Revenue Sharing 
 
To solve for profits as a function of both talent and the degree of revenue sharing, we 
need to develop an expression for changes in the optimal level of talent as revenue sharing, a, 
changes. The standard procedure in QF ( 1992,  1995),  Vrooman (1995),  Marburger (1997), 
Rascher (1997) and Késenne (2000) is to differentiate the marginal revenue, the first two terms in 
(5), with respect to  a to determine how marginal revenue shifts with revenue sharing. In the 
context of their models, the sign of this derivative indicates how revenue sharing affects parity. 
Since marginal revenue is also the numerator of (7), we differentiate (7) with respect to a, but not 
because we are interested in saying something about parity, but because this derivative is useful 
when the optimized profit function is differentiated 
Differentiating (7) with respect to the revenue share, a, retained by the home team yields:  
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q
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a 2
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where the “bar” over a variable or set of variables again refers to the mean of the products. 
The sign of this derivative is not obvious. If clubs possess Cournot conjectures then zj = 0 
for all clubs. If team 1’s talent has a larger effect on its own attendance than its road attendance 
( 1 1 j g g > ) then the derivative is positive and marginal revenue shifts down with greater revenue 
sharing. This is the “normal” case found in the literature and drives the parity invariance result of 
revenue sharing. That is, an increase in revenue sharing, a lower a, leads to a decrease in talent 
and no change in parity
9. Marburger (1997) points out that the derivative could be negative even 
with Cournot conjectures if the club plays in a small home market. In this case revenue sharing 
will also move the league towards parity. 
If conjectures are competitive then z j =  -1 for all clubs. This is equivalent to a talent 
constraint since it means that team 1 conjectures that the talent it acquires will be entirely at the 
expense of the other (n-1) teams in the league. The derivative is still positive if  j 1 1 g g >  for all 
clubs, which is not unreasonable. 
Cartel conjectures imply that z j = 1 so that each club matches the acquisition of talent by 
team 1 per game. Team 1 then anticipates that all other clubs will react to talent acquisition so as 
to maintain their market shares. The derivative in (8) then depends simply on the difference 
                                                 
9 The decrease in talent will also shift in the demand curve for tickets by reducing attendance.    10
between the home game marginal revenue for team 1 and the average of the home game marginal 
revenues for all other home  clubs when they play team 1 . This could be positive (above) or 
negative (below) depending on where the home club average revenue lies in the distribution of all 
average home revenues. However unlikely the cartel conjecture seems, we retain it as illustrative 
of the range of consequences that conjectures have on revenue sharing outcomes
10. Our point is 
that the sign of (8) depends on the magnitudes of the g’s and the nature of the conjectures.  
The optimized profit function can be found by substituting (7) into (1) and simplifying by 
converting some of the terms to averages. 
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Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to a and requiring that it be negative means that 
revenue sharing has a positive effect on profit for team 1. This solution implies inequality (10) 
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where ARj1 is the average of the per game revenue of the other j clubs when they play team 1 in 
their own parks, AR1 is the per game revenue of team 1 in its own park
11. Utilizing (5) and 
rearranging, (10) reduces to 
 
                                                 
10 If all clubs maintain the same talent shares every season, relative attendances and revenues would not be 
expected to change (given no price changes) and the expectation of league standings would be the same 
every season. Of course actual results could differ due to differences in revenue and cost conditions. The 
analysis would be complicated since the derivative in (5) would have to include additional terms for the 
effect of a change in t1 on the conjectures. 
11 Note that AR1 is not average revenue per unit of talent. AR1
* is the optimized per game revenue for team 
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The elasticity  a h  measures the percentage reduction in talent for team 1 (or percentage increase 
in talent for the visiting team j) in response to a reduction in a. Condition (11) neatly decomposes 
the decision for team 1 to support greater revenue sharing
12. As a is reduced, the optimal talent 
level of team 1 falls since  a ¶ ¶
*
1 t  > 0 by assumption, and consequently  a h >0. This lowers home 
gate revenue for team 1 and all other j teams through (2b) and (3). If talent levels for the other j 
teams do not change in response, then lowering a simply exchanges team 1’s home gate revenue 
for all other team’s home gate revenue. If the average revenue of the other clubs is greater than 
the average home gate revenue for team 1, revenue sharing raises net revenue for team 1. This is 
the essence of condition (11) when z = 0 for all clubs (Cournot conjecture). Each club faces its 
own unique value for condition (11). Since marginal revenue shifts down for all clubs (through 
the assumption of  a ¶ ¶
*
1 t  > 0 for all clubs and  a falls with increased revenue sharing), the 
marginal cost of talent will also be driven down for all clubs. This is why marginal cost does not 
appear in (11).  
With competitive conjectures in talent, z = -1 for all clubs and condition (11) becomes 
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1             (12) 
 
The reduction in talent for team 1 from greater revenue sharing is now acquired by all 
other j clubs
13, raising their home gate revenues on the margin. The last term in (12) measures the 
increase in net revenue for team 1 through increased sharing of the home revenues of the j other 
clubs. The last bracketed term is just the value of the marginal product of team j’s own talent. 
Hence the last term in (12) is a bonus revenue that team 1 receives from greater revenue sharing 
due to the competitive conjecture in talent. Revenue sharing will be more attractive to clubs 
                                                 
12 Moving from (10) to (11), the fact that we are only considering increased revenue sharing, and a 
subsequent fall in the value of a, gives rise to  a ¶  < 0 and the subtraction on the RHS of (11). 
13 That is, if team 1 gives up one unit of talent per game, the visiting club acquires that one unit of talent. 
Since team 1 plays each club only once at home, the total reduction in talent by team 1 is distributed evenly 
around the league.   12
whose average home gate revenue is very close to the average home gate revenue for all other j 
clubs that it plays on the road. 
With cartel conjectures in talent, z = 1 for all clubs, the argument is just the reverse of the 
competitive conjecture case. With greater revenue sharing, the reduction in talent for team 1 is 
just matched by all other clubs, reducing their home gate revenues. Team 1 would then prefer not 
to share more in these lower club j revenues. The sign of the last term in (12) is reversed and 
revenue sharing is less attractive to clubs near the average gate revenue of all other j clubs. 
Clubs that operate in large markets (large AR1) will not support revenue sharing. For a 
league to adopt revenue sharing, condition (11) must hold for a majority of clubs, regardless of 
the talent conjecture,  implying that there must be a non-uniform league distribution for average 
per game revenues, and thus the values of marginal products of talent.
14.  
Figure 1 aids depicts the different conjecture regimes by plotting a, the share of revenue 
retained by the home club, against per game revenue. In each conjecture regime, the revenue 
sharing is an all or nothing decision for the club. Reducing a increases the degree of revenue 
sharing and slides the club along the revenue line to the left. If condition (11) holds, the relevant 
revenue line is downward sloping and the club would optimally choose the value  a = 0, 
essentially trading its own revenue for the average revenue of the other clubs
15. If condition (11) 
does not hold, the club would optimally choose a = 1 and keep all of its own revenue. There is no 
middle ground for the optimal a. Only a bang-bang solution results. If a majority of clubs satisfy 
(11), revenue sharing will be adopted. 
The base case  revenue line is drawn in Figure 1 with Cournot conjectures. For small 
revenue clubs ( 1 1 j AR AR < ), the revenue line under competitive conjectures in Figure 1 is steeper 
than the line with Cournot conjectures (the line pivots around R 1 since a club could always 
choose to keep its own revenue by choosing a = 1). Revenue sharing becomes more attractive 
with competitive conjectures since reductions in team 1’s talent are matched by increases in talent 
of all other clubs, from which team 1 benefits. Revenue sharing becomes less attractive with 
cartel conjectures as reductions in talent for team 1 are matched by equal talent reductions for all 
other clubs. Team 1 must then share in their lower revenues. 
 
                                                 
14 Technically the average revenue and value of marginal product of talent would both have to be above or 
below the league average for each club in addition to the league distributions being uniform. In this case, 
the vote to adopt revenue sharing could be split 50-50. 
15 Since marginal cost falls as a is reduced, we can couch the discussion in terms of revenue rather than 
profit.   13
Perverse effects of revenue sharing on talent 
 
Obviously if  a ¶ ¶
*
1 t  = 0 in (12), then  a p ¶ ¶
*
1  = 0 since the marginal revenue is 
unaffected by revenue sharing. The demand for talent will not change and parity is left 
unaffected. Condition (12) does not change if  a ¶ ¶
*
1 t  < 0 with Cournot conjectures. This would 
be an unusual case since each club captures a larger share of its revenues from road games. The 
Cournot revenue line in Figure 1  is unaffected, however the revenue line with competitive 
conjectures becomes flatter than the Cournot revenue line. The revenue line with cartel 
conjectures becomes steeper than the Cournot revenue line. With competitive conjectures and 
a ¶ ¶
*
1 t  < 0, greater revenue sharing increases the demand for talent for each club, who must bid 
talent away from all other clubs, reducing the revenues of all other clubs. Clubs would then prefer 
to share less in the reduced revenues of all other clubs. With cartel conjectures, the argument is 
just the opposite. 
In the perverse case, greater revenue sharing shifts marginal revenue upward for every 
club, increasing the demand for talent and raising payroll costs. Clubs who will support revenue 
sharing play in large home markets and face low marginal talent costs. This would appear to be 
counter-intuitive based on casual empirical observations of club market size and payroll costs. 
Large market clubs tend to have high payroll costs and probably high marginal talent costs, all the 
while experiencing a larger return from their own talent at home than on the road. A small 
number of clubs may fit this description, but most would not making the likelihood of majority 
support for revenue sharing small.  
 
The QF model again 
 
The QF (1992, 1995) model finds that revenue sharing raises profits for all clubs. This 
result can be shown to rely on  a restriction QF impose on condition (11). QF specify home 
revenue as a function of home winning percentage only, where winning percentage is determined 
by the relative talent of the home club. Thus increasing home talent will reduce the winning 
percentage of the other club in their two team model. In our framework, the QF model imposes 
the restrictions 
2
1 1 ˆ t t j - = g , t ˆ 1 1 = g  and z i = 0, where  t ˆ is total talent a cross all n clubs. 
Maximizing (1) with respect to t 1, then solving for  the equivalent form of (11) without taking 
means gives 
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Since the first term in (13) is of order (n-1) and the second term is of order (n-1)
2, the 
sign of (13) is negative and profits always rise with revenue sharing
16. 
 
Central pool revenue sharing 
 
We assume that a league operates with the straight-pool plan discussed in section 3 , 
however the results are the same for a split-pool plan without the side payments to the poorer 
clubs. Despite its apparent simplicity, this form of revenue sharing is much more complicated to 
model. Profit for team 1 can be expressed as 
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where ROL is the rest of the league other than team 1 and a bar over a variable means the average 
over all games and n clubs (where relevant).  Converting all revenues to per game averages 
simplifies the exposition. In (14), the sources of revenue for team 1 have been extracted into 
separate bracketed components to emphasize the nature of the revenue sharing. The first term is 
simply the average revenue team 1 earns from its (n-1) home games that it does not contribute to 
the central fund. The second term is the share of its contributed home revenues to the fund that it 
will receive back at the end of the season. The third term is the share of central fund revenue that 
team 1 receives from the revenues of all other clubs. The revenues for each source are given by 
(15). 
 
                                                 
16 Suppose (13) is just equal to zero so profits do not change with revenue sharing. Solving for the optimal 















. If for any club,  j j P P g g > 1 1  then t1* < 0. An equilibrium could with 
no clubs in the league could result since as wealthy clubs exit,  j j P g  falls until for the last club, t1* = 0.   15
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An interesting feature of (14) is the presence of the last bracketed term, which is the share 
of revenue team 1 receives from the central fund for games that it does  not play. In our 
framework, an expansion franchise adds one more team contributing to the central fund. 
Generally the number of games each club plays over a season does not change with expansion, so 
the contribution of any one pre-expansion club to the central fund is left virtually unchanged, 
however pre-expansion clubs will receive a larger share payment if the revenues of the expansion 
club are above the league average. Leagues will always support expansion to large revenue clubs. 
Expansion clubs that play in small markets that earn below the league average revenue may still 
enter the league if the expansion fee can compensate for the loss of share revenue for the existing 
clubs from the central fund. 
The subscript j does not include team 1 while the subscript k does include team 1. Team 1 
maximizes its profit in (14) subject to (15) to give the optimal level of talent. 
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As before, we take the derivative of (16) with respect to  a to determine how talent 
demand changes under revenue sharing. 
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The sign of (17) will depend on the signs of the g’s and the assumption of the value of the 
conjecture z. W ith Cournot conjectures, z  = 0  for all clubs and (17) is positive - the “normal” 
case. With competitive conjectures (talent constraint), z j = -1 and, assuming the return to home 
talent is greater than the return to visiting talent, (17) is again positive. The sign of (17) cannot be 
determined if conjectures are collusive (zj = 1), however it is likely that (17) will be positive if 
clubs are not too small. 
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The optimized profit function for team 1 is given by 
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Maximizing (18) with respect to a gives, after some simplification 
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The derivative in (19) must be negative for revenue sharing to improve profit for any 
club. The first bracketed term in (19) can be simplified utilizing the first-order condition in (16). 
Rearranging gives 
 































































1 1 1 1  (20) 
 
Condition (20) for central pool revenue sharing differs from condition (11) for traditional 
revenue sharing in several ways. In condition (11), home revenue per game must be less than road 
revenue per game only for the games  in which team 1 p articipates. In condition (20), home 
revenue per game must be less than the average per game revenue for all other teams in the 
league. The second term on the RHS of (20) is the marginal increase in the net revenue of team 1 
with increased sharing. Of course with Cournot conjectures in talent, other clubs do not respond 
to the reduction in talent of team 1 and the condition simplifies to an average revenue 
requirement. With competitive conjectures, the large RHS term is positive and thus makes 
revenue sharing more attractive to teams close to the average revenue of all other j clubs. With all 
other j clubs increasing their talent in response to the reduction in team 1’s talent, team 1 reaps 
the benefit of higher home gate revenues, higher gate revenues for its road games, and higher 
revenues for games in which it is not involved. The cartel conjecture again gives the opposite 
result. 
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The club’s decision to support a vote to revenue share is a bang-bang solution, analogous 
to the presentation in Figure 1 for the decision to vote for traditional revenue sharing. The effect 
of different conjectures on the slope of the revenue line is qualitatively the same. The presence of 
the number of clubs, n , in the RHS of (20), might lead one to conclude that expansion of the 
number of clubs would make revenue sharing more attractive with competitive conjectures. It is 
not hard to show that both of the relevant bracketed terms are increasing in n. However this is not 
a general result since we assume that team 1 plays each of the other j teams once. Expanding the 
league by one club adds one more home game and road game to team 1’s schedule, as it also does 
for all other j clubs. Increasing revenue sharing and allowing expansion then allows team 1 (and 
all other j teams) to capture the increased revenue from one more home and away game when 
talent is absorbed by the rest of the league. In general, expansion does not increase the number of 
games that a club plays in a professional sports league. 
 
IV. THE EVIDENCE 
 
Professional sports clubs can achieve higher profits through revenue sharing if conditions 
are right. With traditional revenue sharing, a club will experience an increase in profit if condition 
(11) is met, regardless of whether conjectures in talent are Cournot,  competitive (talent 
constraint) or cartel-like.  A club’s p rofit will increase with  traditional  revenue sharing  in the 
“normal” case (greater revenue sharing decreases talent demand implying  a ¶ ¶
*
1 t  > 0) if its home 
gate revenue is smaller than the average gate revenue for  it’s road games. Implicit in the 
derivation of condition (11) is the requirement that marginal talent cost decreases more than 
marginal revenue for clubs that support revenue sharing. Hence the decision to adopt revenue 
sharing is as much a decision to hold down player salaries as it is to correct inequities in the 
distribution of club revenues.  
Major league baseball replaced its use of traditional revenue sharing with central-pool 
type revenue sharing in its 1996 collective bargaining agreement. The NFL did the same at the 
start of its 2002 season. Club profit can increase with central-pool revenue sharing if the club’s 
revenue is less than the average of all other club’s revenues, according to condition (20). Our 
model suggests that a larger number of clubs in each league must have satisfied condition (20) 
compared to condition (11). Was this the case?  To test for condition (11), w e estimated the 
average home gate revenue for each club in MLB, the NHL and the NFL for the 1999-2000 and 
2000-2001 seasons. We also estimated the average road revenue for each club for the same 
seasons. A club should support traditional type revenue sharing if the ratio of average road   18
revenue to average home revenue is greater than one. Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide the results. The 
NHL does not use traditional-type revenue sharing, yet a bare majority of owners (17/30 and 
16/30) would have voted to adopt it given the results of Table 2. Support for traditional revenue 
sharing is slightly stronger in the NFL (16/31 and 19/31), but not overwhelming. Baseball would 
have found the least support for traditional revenue sharing (15/30 and 14/30) over the two 
seasons. The NHL and the NFL share very similar distributions for the revenue ratio with average 
ratios of away to home revenue and standard deviations of approximately 1.075 and 0.31. The 
average ratio and standard deviation is much higher for MLB at approximately 1.4 and 1.11 
respectively. Baseball has some spectacular winners and losers from traditional revenue sharing: 
Montreal gained $6.56 for every dollar contributed in the 2001 season; Florida gained $2.45 for 
every dollar contributed; Boston and San Francisco gained only $0.57 for every dollar 
contributed. These revenue disparities account for the large mean and standard deviation of the 
MLB ratio distribution, however only a minority of clubs benefit under the plan. 
To gain enough support for central-pool revenue sharing, t he distribution of average 
home revenues must be heavily skewed to the right, so that the league will be composed of a 
majority of clubs earning below the average for all other clubs in the league. If more clubs satisfy 
condition (20) than condition (11), then central-pool type revenue  sharing will more condition 
likely be adopted. We present results for the 1990 to 1996 seasons in Table 5 for MLB, the NFL 
and the NBA. Unfortunately we could not acquire NBA game by game attendance data for any of 
those seasons so the results only test evidence for central pool revenue sharing. Several results are 
quite striking. Baseball had the least support for central-pool revenue sharing over the sample 
period, but support would have been much stronger prior to 1996, strong enough to carry a 
majority  vote. Support for central-pool revenue sharing has always been stronger in the NFL 
compared to MLB. The figures indicate that the majority of clubs in the NFL that would vote 
positively grew over the sample period to 70% by 1996. Surprisingly the NBA also demonstrates 
a clear majority for central-pool revenue sharing for every year in the sample, yet the NBA does 
not use revenue sharing. The driving force behind the voting results is the degree of skewness in 
the distributions of local revenue. The NFL local revenue distribution is much more skewed than 
the same for MLB, and is much more skewed than that for the NBA after 1992. With large 
skewness, more clubs will benefits from revenue sharing, which clearly confers with the 
predicted votes.  
It could be that MLB voted to adopt central-pool type revenue sharing with contraction of 
the poorest teams in mind.  This might explain the apparent deadlock in voting for the 2001 
season in Table 5 .  If the two clubs designated for contraction (Minnesota and Montreal) are   19
removed from the 2000 and 2001 season gate revenue estimates in Table 4, still only 14 out of 28 
clubs benefit under the central-pool revenue sharing plan
17. However our gate revenue estimates 
are not without some degree of error. If we include the clubs whose ratio for condition (20) is 
greater than 0.97, the number of clubs rises to 16 out of 28
18 for both seasons.  
Either form of revenue sharing drives down the marginal cost of talent. It could be that 
payroll cost reductions (or a slowing of payroll increases) could move some MLB clubs on the 
margin of voting against revenue sharing to voting for revenue sharing. To test this hypothesis, 
we assumed two forms of payroll reductions. First, we reduced the payroll of each MLB club by 
3%, 10% and 50% of the league average payroll using the data in Table 1 for the 2001 season. 
Only one club moved from non-support to support of revenue sharing. Second, we reduced the 
payroll of each MLB club by 3%, 10% and 50% successively of its own payroll. The result was 
the same. Our results again suggest that higher profits, whether achieved through payroll cost 
reductions or the redistributive effects on revenues, are not the driving force behind revenue 




The basis of the theoretical model developed in this paper is that a club owner will vote 
to institute some form of revenue sharing if his or her profit increases as a result. We then derive 
a necessary condition for this to be the case under two different forms of revenue sharing. While 
striving for parity is another important motivation for revenue sharing that has been discussed in 
the literature, we abstract from analyzing the effects on parity in our framework.  
This paper makes a number of contributions to literature, principally the explicit account 
of the voting requirement for revenue sharing, and the use of different conjectures on input 
(talent). The median voter problem with revenue sharing has not been addressed in the literature. 
If a majority of club owners satisfy our condition(s), revenue sharing should be adopted by the 
league. Positive skewness of the league revenue distribution is a necessary condition to obtain a 
majority voting result and obviously influences the number of clubs that satisfy our condition(s). 
Actual revenue distributions for the major North American sports leagues demonstrate marked 
positive skewness, justifying the use of the voting model.  
                                                 
17 Gate revenues are used in place of local revenues here. In the NFL, the effect of contraction is much 
more pronounced than in MLB. Eliminating the two lowest revenue clubs, Arizona and Atlanta, increases 
the number of clubs who benefit under central-pool revenue sharing to 21 out of 29 for the 2000-2001 
season. Oddly, contraction is not an issue for NFL owners. 
18 The effect is even greater for the NFL where 19 clubs satisfy condition (11) and 22 clubs satisfy 
condition (20) for the 2000-2001 season.   20
Input conjectures form a central feature of our model. We use Cournot conjectures as the 
base case for the voting model. Under normal effects of revenue sharing on talent demand, 
competitive input conjectures (equivalent to a perceived league talent constraint) make revenue 
sharing more attractive, perhaps explaining why salary caps and revenue sharing appear to go 
hand-in-hand in some professional leagues (NFL). Cartel input conjectures are shown to make 
revenue sharing less attractive relative to competitive or Cournot conjectures and could even 
cause a club owner to vote against it.    21
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Table 1 


























                 
 Anaheim   30,208   10,927   26,195   24,401   91,731   9,594   101,300   25 
 Arizona   46,509   14,174   32,970   18,479   125,132   (4,432)  157,284   -36584 
 Atlanta   62,141   19,988   37,692   24,401   146,851   (10,647)  161,211   -25007 
 Baltimore   53,216   20,994   29,691   24,401   128,302   (6,807)  126,842   -5347 
 Boston   89,743   33,353   29,485   24,401   176,982   (16,438)  174,270   -13726 
 Chicago (NL)   51,189   23,559   30,642   24,401   129,774   (6,568)  124,977   -1771 
 Chicago (AL)   30,898   30,092   26,291   24,401   111,682   (4,201)  117,369   -9888 
 Cincinnati   32,102   7,861   6,523   24,401   70,887   13,404   81,943   2348 
 Cleveland   69,470   21,076   45,295   24,401   162,242   (13,254)  160,361   -11373 
 Colorado   54,015   18,200   35,197   24,401   131,813   (6,029)  135,228   -9444 
 Detroit   42,299   19,073   21,018   24,401   106,791   5,127   106,258   5660 
 Florida   16,756   15,353   4,037   24,401   60,547   18,561   88,288   -9180 
 Houston   49,161   13,722   36,826   24,401   124,629   (5,185)  125,843   -6399 
 Kansas City   19,520   6,505   13,270   24,401   63,696   15,997   79,830   -137 
 Los Angeles   50,764   27,342   41,100   24,401   143,607   (9,107)  188,950   -54450 
 Milwaukee   46,021   5,918   37,010   24,401   113,350   1,744   98,965   16129 
 Minnesota   17,605   7,273   6,987   24,401   56,266   19,069   74,799   536 
 Montreal   6,405   536   2,829   24,401   34,171   28,517   72,690   -10002 
 New York (NL)   73,971   46,251   38,162   24,401   182,631   (15,669)  174,339   -7377 
 New York (AL)   98,000   56,750   47,057   24,401   242,208   (26,540)  201,349   14319 
 Oakland   24,992   9,458   13,932   24,401   75,469   10,520   82,582   3407 
 Philadelphia   30,435   18,940   7,739   24,401   81,515   11,752   102,380   -9113 
 Pittsburgh   48,610   9,097   26,598   24,401   108,706   1,782   111,690   -1202 
 St. Louis   67,084   11,905   27,581   24,401   132,459   (8,229)  130,590   -6360 
 San Diego   34,381   12,436   8,504   24,401   79,722   8,668   95,873   -7483.14 
 San Francisco   67,173   17,197   61,524   24,401   170,295   (6,308)  151,295   12692 
 Seattle   76,570   37,860   56,211   24,401   202,434   (18,791)  168,168   15475 
 Tampa Bay   18,193   15,511   28,633   18,258   80,595   12,384   103,438   -10459 
 Texas   50,664   25,284   34,561   24,401   134,910   (8,744)  150,599   -24433 
 Toronto   25,363   14,460   14,255   24,401   78,479   9,830   131,406   -43097 
 
Source: Accompanying documents to testimony by MLB Commissioner Bud Selig, December 6, 2001.  
http://roadsidephotos.com/baseball/mlbsez.htm 
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Table 2 
Ratio of average home gate revenue to average road gate revenue for NHL. 
  2001-2001 season  2001-2002 season 




















Anaheim  $683873  $810254  1.185  $608027  $866357  1.425 
Atlanta  782836  745145  0.952  683283  814703  1.192 
Boston  764851  806138  1.054  806530  854481  1.059 
Buffalo  720556  779690  1.082  724911  854690  1.179 
Calgary  546225  806840  1.477  516516  822886  1.593 
Carolina  551056  755328  1.371  600197  879641  1.466 
Chicago  713405  786807  1.103  740612  856555  1.157 
Colorado  1136422  818142  0.720  1176757  871205  0.740 
Columbus  849284  764498  0.900  882316  821520  0.931 
Dallas  959366  776253  0.809  1406431  831482  0.591 
Detroit  1047538  859851  0.821  1075905  894194  0.831 
Edmonton  544072  815625  1.499  572453  818422  1.430 
Florida  694534  791867  1.140  767363  812644  1.059 
LA  867564  800169  0.922  943874  837049  0.887 
Minnesota  902861  784484  0.869  927217  800779  0.864 
Montreal  771231  765258  0.992  782267  819471  1.048 
Nashville  688044  771251  1.121  643024  831830  1.294 
New Jersey  799641  804242  1.006  866840  864397  0.997 
NY Islanders  384366  830892  2.162  504550  909925  1.803 
NY Rangers  1197924  831646  0.694  1187300  887045  0.747 
Ottawa  765991  793073  1.035  782171  816477  1.044 
Philadelphia  1219749  806517  0.661  1219357  884174  0.725 
Phoenix  550905  810760  1.472  522919  854654  1.634 
Pittsburgh  788247  863468  1.095  833976  830087  0.995 
San Jose  824848  770259  0.934  855517  825251  0.965 
St. Louis  878789  825796  0.940  996019  859660  0.863 
Tampa Bay  604614  775114  1.282  708914  787544  1.111 
Toronto  1290461  782320  0.606  1355539  822115  0.606 
Vancouver  796829  799121  1.003  864032  823195  0.953 
Washington  596835  801527  1.343  771337  859501  1.114 
             
Number of clubs 
with ratio > 1 
    17      16 
Mean  =       1.075      1.077 
St. deviation =      0.314      0.302 
 
Sources: Game attendance from sports.espn.go.com. Average ticket prices from www.teammarketing.com.   24
Table 3 
Ratio of average home gate revenue to average road gate revenue for NFL. 
  2001-2001 season  2001-2002 season 




















Arizona  $1782808  $3417874  1.917  $1444380  $3517235  2.435117 
Atlanta  2102146  3188771  1.517  2123389  3236016  1.523986 
Baltimore  2948120  3519195  1.194  3477753  3896810  1.120496 
Buffalo  3228202  3340360  1.035  2906018  3379781  1.163028 
Carolina  4224460  3337370  0.790  4364816  3457841  0.792208 
Chicago  2805278  3355205  1.196  2858509  3693878  1.292239 
Cincinnati  3302281  2985423  0.904  3183517  3565542  1.120001 
Cleveland  3181046  2935056  0.923  3279904  3441041  1.049129 
Dallas  3019856  3925226  1.300  3159381  3512869  1.111885 
Denver  3503444  3302380  0.943  5808488  3297991  0.567788 
Detroit  2963290  3309553  1.117  2937609  3228227  1.09893 
Green Bay  2900010  3386648  1.168  3200119  3887627  1.214838 
Indianapolis  2667988  3220873  1.207  3073524  3574164  1.162888 
Jacksonville  3661045  3047346  0.832  3798827  3256218  0.857164 
Kansas City  3642187  3023547  0.830  4027565  3856315  0.957481 
Miami  3325612  3234620  0.973  4141462  3425530  0.827131 
Minnesota  3097898  3076504  0.993  3378445  3417357  1.011518 
New England  2880149  3092905  1.074  2880149  3571050  1.239884 
New Orleans  2872074  2827184  0.984  3494543  3613802  1.034127 
NY Giants  3580688  3293354  0.920  4390400  3833967  0.873261 
NY Jets  4013580  3222228  0.803  4485688  3557959  0.79318 
Oakland  2991316  3177477  1.062  3053249  3949740  1.293619 
Philadelphia  2872222  3274262  1.140  3043881  3833051  1.259264 
Pittsburgh  2243971  3540798  1.578  3871168  3830530  0.989502 
San Diego  3172378  3239621  1.021  3475265  3479329  1.001169 
San Francisco  3387275  3134698  0.925  3374100  3336685  0.988911 
Seattle  2809363  3308050  1.178  2714041  4101436  1.511192 
St. Louis  2829593  3592010  1.269  3278079  3388884  1.033802 
Tampa Bay  4427133  3469764  0.784  4629086  3227354  0.69719 
Tennessee  4060575  3631981  0.894  4192619  3505859  0.836198 
Washington  6627194  2946059  0.445  6391248  3519060  0.550606 
             
Number of clubs 
with ratio > 1 
    16      19 
Mean  =       1.062      1.077 
St. deviation =      0.274      0.337 
 
Sources: Game attendance from sports.espn.go.com. Average ticket prices from www.teammarketing.com.   25
Table 4 
Ratio of average home gate revenue to average road gate revenue for MLB. 
  2000 season  2001 season 




















Anaheim  336585.5  525923.6  1.563  282105  603770  2.140 
Arizona  602307.8  504486.4  0.838  442143  551732  1.248 
Atlanta  788533.9  555337.6  0.704  724009  529874  0.732 
Baltimore  804882.6  485695.7  0.603  705237  595722  0.845 
Boston  904424.8  586805.6  0.649  1116087  640387  0.574 
Chicago (NL)  607476.8  553107.5  0.910  744826  613284  0.823 
Chicago (AL)  348169.1  567260.4  1.629  413505  526939  1.274 
Cincinnati  337278.7  660976.3  1.960  366672  596772  1.628 
Cleveland  878150.6  540735.2  0.616  886368  533878  0.602 
Colorado  669311.5  474525.8  0.709  594658  518584  0.872 
Detroit  776704.5  483893.7  0.623  503142  534171  1.062 
Florida  190820.3  488163.7  2.558  200535  490438  2.446 
Houston  755734.1  496478.4  0.657  635355  523959  0.825 
Kansas City  243608.4  565167.9  2.320  246199  539953  2.193 
Los Angeles  573532.1  583743.5  1.018  577727  545574  0.944 
Milwaukee  223302.1  442761  1.983  566373  550022  0.971 
Minnesota  122063.5  559745.9  4.586  241364  551253  2.284 
Montreal  117663.4  489457.2  4.160  72924  478432  6.561 
N.Y. (NL)  881496.9  544090.8  0.617  739410  519857  0.703 
N.Y. (AL)  1046568  673433.1  0.643  1058646  659622  0.623 
Oakland  242257.8  616888.8  2.546  374244  528804  1.413 
Philadelphia  274170.7  547702.1  1.998  327395  503431  1.538 
Pittsburgh  255286.1  514622.6  2.016  599787  490398  0.818 
San Diego  394884  511122  1.294  408443  533461  1.306 
San Francisco  869353  524306  0.603  995041  568128  0.571 
Seattle  910680  503443  0.553  780968  583249  0.747 
St. Louis  723571  549913  0.760  822695  596174  0.725 
Tampa Bay  247925  539316  2.175  258711  599988  2.319 
Texas  688486  564473  0.820  630164  535085  0.849 
Toronto  365325  532219  1.457  365825  593135  1.621 
             
Number of clubs 
with ratio > 1 
    15      14 
Mean  =       1.452      1.375 
St. deviation =      1.037      1.137 
 
Sources: Game attendance from sports.espn.go.com. Average ticket prices from www.teammarketing.com 





Condition (21) for 1990-96 seasons 
 
Number of clubs supporting central pool plan  Skewness coefficient 
  MLB  NFL  NBA    MLB  NFL  NBA 
               
1990  17/26  16/28  20/27    1.315  1.982  2.803 
1991  16/26  17/28  17/27    0.893  1.266  1.911 
1992  16/26  18/28  18/27    0.801  1.537  2.098 
1993  17/28  18/28  17/27    0.835  2.776  1.163 
1994  15/28  18/28  18/27    0.566  3.088  1.213 
1995  17/28  19/30  16/27    0.526  2.979  0.928 
1996  15/28  21/30  17/29    0.988  2.172  0.923 
1998  16/30        0.612     
1999  17/30        0.627     
2001  15/30        0.551     
 
Source: Local revenues for 1990-96 taken from estimates by Michael Ozanian reported in various issues of Financial World (provided 
by Rod Fort). Local revenues for MLB for 1998-99 taken from Levin et al. (2000). Local revenues for MLB for 2001 taken from 
accompanying documents to testimony by MLB Commissioner Bud Selig, December 6, 2001, 
http://roadsidephotos.com/baseball/mlbsez.htm. 
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